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CREDITOR REMEDIES

CREDITOR REMEDIES: PROVIDING DUE PROCESS AT A DISCOUNT
Creditors in the consumer loan market are constantly concerned with the
difficulty and expense of collecting loans in default; consequently, a long
list of creditor remedies has emerged., The legal status of a number of these
sanctions, however, is presently in a state of flux as legislatures consider reform and the courts call for more rigorous procedural due process safeguards.
Creditors are quick to point out that an increase in procedural restrictions
would lead inevitably to increased collection costs and a concomitant upward
movement of interest rates. As legal ceilings on interest rates are approached,
the creditor, who would no longer be able to compensate for increased costs
by raising rates, must respond by reducing or eliminating loans to high risk
borrowers.2 Thus, the issues of credit cost and availability seem inextricably,
tied to any meaningful reform. Little is accomplished when great strides are
taken to protect the borrower's interest if, in the end, credit is unavailable to
those who need it most.
This commentary will initially outline recent legislative action regarding
consumer credit and discuss requirements set forth by the Supreme Court
for satisfying procedural due process in the context of creditor remedies.
Next, the structure of the consumer credit market will be examined along
with several empirical studies that have attempted to evaluate the economic
impact of reforming creditor remedies. Finally, an attempt will be made to
demonstrate how a satisfactory accommodation can be reached between the
economic interests of the creditor and the economic and procedural interests
of the debtor.
DEVELOPMENT

OF CONSUMER

CREDIT AND

CURRENT TRENDS

IN REFORM

Fundamental changes in this nation's commercial practices generally
emerge only after a long period of gradual development. An exception to
this rule has been the explosive growth of consumer credit since World War
II. In 1945 installment debt in the United States was a negligible $2.5 billion;3
by the end of 1974 that figure had risen to over $155 billion.4 Such a dramatic
increase is not merely the result of an expanding economy marked by rising
gross national output and disposable personal income.5 It represents, as well,
1. A partial list of the most common creditor remedies and collection sanctions includes: acceleration of payment, required payment of creditor's attorney fees by defaulting
debtor, confessions of judgment (cognovit notes), cross-collateralization, repossession, deficiency judgments, wage assignment, garnishment, levy on personal property, use of the
holder in due course doctrine, and waiver of buyer defenses.
2. This sentiment has often been expressed by jurists and commentators alike. See, e.g.,
Adams v. Egley, 838 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc.,
121 N.J. Super. 1, 12, 295 A.2d 402, 407-08 (1972); Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession:
An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. RFv. 82 (1973); White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 503; Comment, Creditor's Rights Self-Help - UCC §9-503, 1972 U. ILL. L.J. 635.
3. Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, in CONSUMErt CRarr REFORM

4 (1970).
4. U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPoRT, Feb. 3, 1975 at 17.
5. Between 1950 and 1964, installment credit grew at an annual rate of 10.5% while
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a major shift in the consumer's attitude toward the use of credit. The confluence of social pressure to possess material symbols of status and ever-increasing job security has provided an atmosphere that encourages the acquisi6
tion today of possessions to be paid for with tomorrow's income.
Prior to 1940, control over consumer credit transactions was primarily
limited to general interest and usury statutes. Such statutes, however, regulated
only cash loans since, under the common law "time price doctrine," credit
extended by retailers was not viewed as involving "interest." 7 That doctrine
was based upon the legal principle that the owner of property has the absolute
right to sell such property for whatever price he may choose. Therefore, a
vendor was entitled to sell at one price for cash in hand, but might demand
a higher price if payment was to be made in installments or in a lump sum
at a future date.8 These credit sales transactions were regularly challenged
in the courts. Although occasionally the transactions were found to violate
general interest and usury statutes, 9 more often courts followed the common
law precedent of excluding retail sales credit transactions from statutory
strictures.'0
The growth of the credit industry in the years since World War II and
the recent renaissance of consumerism" have provided the catalyst for a
wide range of reforms. In 1952 the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws approved the official draft of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC). Although the UCC did much to bring uniformity to commercial
transactions, creditor remedies provided in Article 9 were basically a restatement of existing law. The drafters decided, as a matter of policy, to omit
specific requirements regarding procedural safeguards on default in consumer
credit transactions; 12 instead, they chose to include such matters in a separate
code encompassing all forms of credit transactions. Accordingly, in 1968 the
drafters approved the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC).

3

gross national product grew at 5.8% and personal income at 5.5%. Caplovitz, supra note 3,
at 5.
6. Id.
7. The question of the general usury and interest statutes' applicability was not limited
to the cash loan-credit dichotomy. In some courts the issue of their applicability was
based on a commercial-consumer distinction. See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT
LEGISLATION 83

(1965).

8. Moo, Legislative Control of Consumer Credit Transactions, in CONSUMER CREDIT
REFORM 20 (1970).
9. Such decisions typically resulted when the trier of fact concluded that the difference
between the cash price and credit price was only a device to evade the usury laws. See,
e.g., Daniels v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353, reh. denied, 228 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1955);
Brown v. Home Credit Co., 137 So. 2d 887 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
10. See, e.g., Nelson v. Scarritt Motors, Inc., 48 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1950); Davidson .
Davis, 59 Fla. 476, 52 So. 139 (1910); Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Staines, 161 So. 2d
569 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
11. See Gaedeke, The Movement for Consumer Protection: A Century of Mixed Accomplishments, 29 U. WASH. Bus. REv. 31 (Spring 1970).
12. See McCall, The Past as Prologue: A History of the Right to Repossess, 47 S.CAL.
L. REV. 58, 77-78 (1973).
13. Id.
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The UCCC was designed to replace the existing welter of state consumer
credit laws with a comprehensive unified scheme of regulation. The underlying purpose of the proposed code was to provide a sufficient volume of
credit at reasonable rates under conditions fair to both consumer and
creditor. 14 Regarding creditor remedies, 15 the UCCC places restrictions on
the negotiability of consumer paper, 6 garnishment," assignment of wages, 8
confession judgments, 9 repossessions, 20 and deficiency judgments.2 1 Further
limitations have since been recommended.2 2 Although the UCCC has been
adopted in only seven states, 23 its provisions have had an important impact
on consumer credit legislation throughout the country.2 4
At the federal level, Congress passed in 1968 the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), which was designed primarily to promote full disclosure
of credit charges. 25 In addition, the Act limits wage garnishment, 2 which
was singled out for special treatment by Congress because of the particularly
harsh effects it often produces on the debtor's family.2 The Act, however,
limited only the amount of earnings that could be garnished; 28 it offered no
guideliness concerning conditions under which garnishment was to be al-

14. UCCC §1.102(2).
15. Each of the seven states that have adopted the UCCC has chosen among alternative
provisions and made revisions so that the changes in traditional remedies vary. See McCall,
supra note 12, at 62.
16. UCCC §§2.403-.404.

17. Id. §§5.104-.106.
18. Id. §3.403.
19. Id. §3.407.
20. Id. §5.103.
21. Id.
22. See Miller & Warren, A Report on the Revision of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 27 OKiA. L. REv. 1 (1974).

23. Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. at 3.
24. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 5, ch. 14 (Cum. Supp. 1973); D.C. CODE ENcYcL. ANN.
§§28-3308-09, 28-3701-02, 28-3801-16 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. §§501.021-.055 (1973); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§421.00 to 428.00 (1974).
25. Disclosure of interest rates was heralded as the key to a competitive credit market,
but the actual results have been disappointing. See White & Munger, Consumer Sensitivity
to Interest Rates: An Empirical Study of New-Car Buyers and Auto Loans, 69 MICH. L.
REv. 1207 (1971).

26. For discussion of the CCPA's garnishment provisions, see Note, Federal Restrictions
of Wage Garnishments: Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 44 IND. L.J. 267
(1968); Note, Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act and the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 338 (1969).

27. An example of these harsh effects is this reaction of a coal miner's wife: "We
owe . . . so much [my husband] has got only two pay checks in two years. The last
check he got was for $7.32. All the rest from his work in the mines was taken out ahead
to pay our debts. But it's getting better all the time. We'll be out of garnishment the first
of the year. But now, he only gets about two hours of sleep a day [due to a second full-time
job digging graves and setting headstones]." Indianapolis Star, Nov. 23, 1968, at 4, col. 1,
quoted in 44 IND. L.J. 267, 268 n.8 (1968).
28. The Act exempts from garnishment 75% of the debtor's wages or 30 times the
federal minimum hourly wage, whichever is greater.
44 IND. LJ. 267, 268 n.9 (1968).
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lowed. That issue was confronted by the Supreme Court in Sniadach v. Family
FinanceCorp.29

In Sniadach the Court held that a Wisconsin prejudgment wage garnishment procedure failed to meet due process requirements of prior notice and
hearing.30 Under the Wisconsin procedure, 31 the clerk of court, on request
of the creditor, was empowered to serve a writ on the garnishee (employer)
that operated to freeze 50 percent of the debtor's (employee) wages. In striking down this procedure, the Court held that debtors must be given notice
and an opportunity for a judicial hearing prior to garnishment. 32 The decision was an accurate indicator of the Court's predilections regarding creditor
remedies. It was the first in what was to become a series of cases in which
the Court has examined the due process ramifications in debtor-creditor relations.
The second case in this series was Fuentes v. Shevin. 33 There the Court extended the Sniadach rationale to include the repossession of merchandise purchased on credit. Prejudgment replevin statutes in Florida34 and Pennsylvania 35
were found violative of the fourteenth amendment because they failed to
provide an adequate opportunity for the buyer-debtor to be heard prior to
repossession of his chattel. 'The leading role of the Supreme Court in reforming creditor remedies appeared to have come to an end, however, with
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 36 a 1974 decision that reflected the addition of
two new justices to the Fuentes Court.37 Although the Court used procedural
differences- 8 to distinguish the Fuentes statutes from the Louisiana sequestra29. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
30. Id. at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring). See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83
HARV. L. REV. 113 (1969); Note, Attachment and Garnishment - Constitutional Law Due Process of Law, 68 Mim. L. REv. 986 (1970); Comment, Constitutional Law - Due
Process - Prior Hearing in Wage Garnishment, 1970 Wis. L. REy. 181.
31. WIS. STAT. §§267.01-.22 (1971).
32. Whether the decision would require a special hearing prior to final adjudication,
a delay in garnishment until after a final judgment, or have no effect at all would determine
the amount of additional expense to individual creditors.
33. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

34. FLA. STAT. §§78.0l, .07, .08, .10, .13 (1973).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1821 (Supp. 1974); PA. R. OF Civ. PRO. Nos. 1073 (a), (b),
1076, 1077. 12 PA. STAT. App.
36. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, stated: "In sweeping
language, Fuentes v. Shevin . . . enunciated the principle that the constitutional guarantee
of procedural due process requires an adversary hearing before an individual may be
temporarily deprived of any possessory interest in tangible personal property, however
brief the dispossession and however slight his monetary interest in the property. The
Court's decision today withdraws significantly from the full reach of that principle, and
to this extent I think it is fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is overruled." 416 U.S. at
623.
37. Justices Powell and Rehnquist, who took no part in the consideration of Fuentes.
voted with the majority in Mitchell.
38. Unlike the Florida or Pennsylvania statutes struck down in Fuentes, the Louisiana
sequestration statute challenged in Mitchell required a sworn affidavit by the creditor,
judicial issuance of the sequestration writ, and (at the debtor's option) an opportunity to
challenge the sequestration at an immediate post facto hearing. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 620-21 (1974).
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tion statute39 challenged in Mitchell, the effect was to qualify the Fuentes
assertion "that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before deprivation of property takes effect." 40 Thus, the Court held that a narrowly
drawn statute, which does not provide a full panoply of procedural safeguards, might nevertheless satisfy fourteenth amendment due process requirements. Regarding the economic impact of their decision on the credit market,
the Court in Mitchell stated:
As revealed in the various studies and proposals, the principal question yet to be satisfactorily answered is the impact of prior notice and
hearing on the price of credit, and more particularly the mix of procedural requirements necessary to minimize the cost. 41 (emphasis
added).
Eschewing the rigid language of Fuentes, the Mitchell Court pragmatically
looked to the legislatures for a proper "mix of procedural requirements"
so that respective interests would be adequately protected.
The Court appears to have extended the rationale embodied in Mitchell
to garnishment procedures in North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, Inc. 42
In that case the Court struck down a Georgia attachment law 43 that allowed
prejudgment garnishment, but that did not provide the procedural safe4
guards found in the Louisiana sequestration statute approved in Mitchell.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell maintained that due process in a
garnishment situation requires: the posting of bond by the garnishor; the
establishment before a neutral officer of the necessity to resort to the remedy;
the opportunity for an immediate post-garnishment hearing; and the oppor5
tunity for the debtor to free the asset by posting adequate security. If
his requirements are those of the majority, as the holding would suggest,
Justice Powell's guidelines aid in the search for that proper "mix of procedural
requirements" by more specifically defining "due process" in the context of
creditor remedies. The task remaining, that of implementing these due process
requirements so as to minimize adverse effects on the credit market, calls for
46
the combined efforts of economists and law makers.
THE

CONSUMER

CREDIT MARKET:, THE ECONOMICS

OF DEBT FINANCING

A proper evaluation of creditor remedies must include an analysis of
the consumer credit market. 47 The primary sources of consumer credit are
39. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 281 et seq. (West 1960).
40. 407 U.S. at 88.
41. 416 U.S. at 618 n.13. Cited by the Court were Symposium, Creditors Rights, 47 S.
CAL. L. Rrv. 1-164 (1973), and Note, Self-Help Repossession: The Constitutional Attack,
the Legislative Response and the Economnic Implications, 62 GEO. L.J. 273 (1973).
42. 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
43. GA. CODE ANN. §§46-101 to 46-104, 46-401 (1974).
44. North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719, 722 (1975).
45. Id. at 725.
46. For discussion of the policy implications involved in a modification of creditor
remedies, see 5 TECHNICAL STUDIES OF THE
at 153 [hereinafter cited as NCCF STuDIEs].

47. In depth studies can be found in J.

NATIONAL

COMMISSION

CHIMAN & R.
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commercial banks, finance companies, retailers, and credit unions, each of
which operates under special regulations that vary from state to state. The
picture is further complicated by the many types of credit available, including
secured and unsecured personal loans, installment credit on items from autos
to household appliances, revolving credit accounts, and third party credit in
the purchased-paper market. Consequently, any consideration of the impact
of changes in creditor remedies must recognize that effects on the consumer
credit market vary according to "structural" variables, such as the size and
type of loan, the source of credit, and the system of regulation under which
the loan is made.
Creditor remedies represent but one of a number of factors that affect the
interest rate charged by creditors. Those factors include myriad "economic"
variables, for example: imposed ceilings on interest rates; 48 the degree of risk
taken by the lending institution; 49 the degree of competition and freedom of
entry into the consumer credit market;50 the acquisition cost of creditor's
capital; 51 any limitations on the size of loans; 52 and the magnitude of the
lending institution's operating expenses. 53 Collection costs are included in
operating expenses along with the costs of advertising, management, personnel,
and facilities. Further, collection procedures requiring the use of one or more
creditor remedies are less frequently needed than might be expected. Of
every one hundred families that utilize installment credit, only seven per
year fall behind in their payments. 54 Creditors, moreover, are able to collect
60 to 70 percent of all installment payments in arrears by nonlegal means
such as reminder notices, telephone calls, and personal visits.
INDUSTRY:

ITS COSTS AND REGULATION

(1967); and CONSUMER

5
5

Consequently,

CREDIT REFORM

(C. Havighurst

ed. 1970).

48. See Note, Consumer Credit Study, 1968 U. ILL. L. F. 541.
49.

See REPORT

OF THE

NATIONAL

COMMISSION

CONSUMER

ON

FINANCE

109

(1972)

[hereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT].
50. See Zwick, Factors Affecting the Cost of Borrowing by Consumer Finance Companies.
THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY 121 (1967).
51. See Johnson, Conclusions for Regulation, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY 137, 153
(1967).
52. See Zwick, A Cross-Section Study of Industry Costs and Earnings, TIE CONSUMER
FINANCE INDUSTRY 55, 74 (1967).

53. Id. at 61.
54. PAYMENTS MADE BY FAMILIES WITH MONTHLY INSTALLMENT DEBT
(% of all families with installment debt)

1968 ....
1967 ....

paid as
scheduled
71
71

paid
faster
or larger
amounts
13
12

both "got
behind" and
"faster or
larger"
3
3

got
behind
7
7

*Not ascertained, don't know.
Source: G. Katona, L. Mandell, & J. Schmiedeskamp, 1970
33 (1971).
55. NCCF STUDIES, supra note 46, at 151.
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only a very small percentage of all consumer loans require an expenditure
for any of the collection sanctions under consideration here. 56 Looking broadly at the consumer credit market, it becomes apparent that procedural restrictions on creditor remedies are only one factor affecting the cost and
availability of credit.57 Most reform proposals involve modification rather
than abolition of various sanctions, 58 further diluting the impact of the proposed reform. Such an analysis, however, ignores the important question of
whether the existence of adequate creditor remedies is itself a major contributor to the success of nonlegal means of collection. This issue was put
before the National Commission of Consumer Finance (NCCF), created by
Congress in 196859 to study thoroughly the consumer credit market and to
prepare recommendations for its regulation and control.6 0 In pursuit of these
purposes, creditor remedies were examined through the application of three
different methods: legal analysis, 6' a questionnaire survey of creditors' attitudes and operations, and econometrics.
The response to the creditor survey showed that, after simple forgetfulness, the most frequent cause of debtor delinquency was unemployment.
Other significant delinquency causes were overextension of credit relative to
repayment capacity and illness of the debtor. 62 Thus the report surmised
56. This theory was generally supported by a limited study conducted in Lubbock,
Texas. See J. Krahmer, K. Clifford, & C. Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the
Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 Tx. TECH. L. REV. 23, 62 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Texas Study].
57. ROLE OF LEGAL COLLECTION COSTS IN THE CONSUMER CREDIT MARKET

FACTORS DETERMINING
THE COST AND
AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT:
Degree of risk taken
Capital acquisition costs
Level of competition
Freedom of entry
Limitations on loan size
Interest rate ceilings
Operating expenses

OPERATING EXPENSES:
-Advertising
Personnel

COLLECTION COSTS

Management
Facilities

OF LOANS:

lCollection costs

Paid on-time

Nonlegal method used
jLegal action taken*

*Involves use of a creditor remedy.
See text accompanying notes 51-57 supra.
58. This is borne out by the recommendations of the NCCF. See NCCF REPORT, supra
note 49, at 3.
59. The NCCF was established by the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.

§1601 (1970).
60. NCCF REPORT, supranote 49, at 28.
61. A thorough discussion of the legal ramifications of the individual remedies can
be found in Chapter 3 of the NCCF REPORT. Id.

62. NCCF STUDIES, supra note 46, at 151.
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"that the vast majority of delinquent debtors are not 'dead-beats,' but rather
people who have every intention of repaying their debts, and were it not
for their adverse circumstances, they would surely do so." 63 The survey also
demonstrated that most creditors followed a similar pattern in their response
to delinquency. Initially, creditors granted delinquent accounts a grace period
averaging between 12 and 48 days, 64 at the expiration of which the usual procedure was to mail reminder notices. As noted earlier, only 30 to 40 percent
of all delinquencies ever go beyond the reminder-notice stage.65 Following
the reminder notice, creditors usually began to devote personal attention to
the delinquent debtor. Many, if not most, creditors attempt to obtain payment in a step-wise process that involves the least costly means of personal
contact first. The sequence of communication typically includes personal
letters, telephone calls, and visits to the debtor's home. 66 It was only when
these means failed that the creditors resorted to legal sanctions.
The survey asked creditors for their appraisal of various creditor remedies
and the frequency with which they were used. 67 Among procedural provisions
included in credit contracts, acceleration of payment and required payment
of attorney fees by the defaulting borrower were the two most frequently
utilized and were judged by creditors to be highly effective collection devices.68 Of the possible legal actions available to creditors against the defaulting borrower, repossession and garnishment were the most commonly used
and were considered most important by the creditors surveyed.69 The NCCF
study estimated that 80 percent of all formal legal actions brought against
defaulting borrowers were either repossessions or garnishments. T0 Of the
available secondary legal actions, deficiency judgments were found to be
very important. 71 The survey showed that well over half of all repossession
proceedings were accompanied by deficiency judgments, 2 and that 80 percent
of the banks and 75 percent of the finance companies sampled considered deficiency judgments a useful and desirable remedy. 7' Less important, but still
significant, were the cut-off devices of holder in due course and waiver of
buyer defenses, which together constituted approximately ten percent of all
legal actions involving indirect sales credit.74 Although the statistical data
gleaned from the questionnaire responses contributed to an understanding
63. Id.
64. The length of the grace period generally depends on the type and size of the
creditor institution, with single-state retailers allowing the longest grace period. Id.

65. See text accompanying notes 54 and 55 supra.
66. NCCF STUDIES, supra note 46, at 151.
67. The report estimated that the survey accounted for 29% of total bank consumer
credit outstanding in mid-1971, 84% of finance company consumer credit, and 55% of all
retail consumer credit. Id.
68.

Id. at 152.

69. Id.
70. Id. See also text accompanying note 98 infra.
71. Id.
72. This indicates the frequency with which the sale of the repossessed item is not
sufficient to cover the amount of debt outstanding. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss1/6
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of the role of various creditor remedies, an analysis of their actual impact
on the cost and availability of credit was made by means of an econometric
model.
The model employed standard statistical techniques to evaluate the relationship between state-to-state variations in creditor remedies and shifts
in the cost and availability of credit.7 5 In those areas where the results were
statistically significant, 76 the model made it possible to predict the effects of
restructured collection sanctions, thus contributing significantly to an understanding of the economic impact of creditor remedies on the consumer credit
7
market.
Some of the more impressive results were found in the analysis of personal
loans made by finance companies. Prohibition or substantial restriction of
garnishment was found to result in a four percent reduction in the number
of personal loans made by finance companies.78 Similarly, prohibition of attorney fees79 was found to reduce, though to a lesser degree than garnish75. Regression analysis was the statistical tool employed by the NCCF researchers.
This technique relies on logical or theoretical association as formulated by an
algebraic equation that expresses the known value of the dependent variable in relation
to assigned values given the explanatory variables. For example, to determine the effect
of garnishment on the supply of credit, the researchers compared the number of personal
loans per thousand families (dependent variable) in those states that allowed garnishment
to the number of loans per thousand families in states that prohibited or restricted garnishment (explanatory variable).
The figure below shows the downward shift in the function representing the supply of
credit when garnishment is prohibited. The purpose of the regression analysis is to
estimate the value of "a." Id. at 124-30.

do-rsupply function

damount

with garnishment

__-supply function
without garnishment

personal
loans
Sa.

median family income
76. Because of two unfortunate shortcomings, much desirable information could not
be obtained through the study. The technique required sufficient state-to-state variance
'in the legal status of specific sanctions. Thus certain relatively uniform creditor remedies
were not considered, including acceleration, repossession, and deficiency judgments. Id.
at 129. Secondly, meaningful results concerning the effects of sanctions on interest rates
were not obtained because of the widespread use of artificial interest-rate limits that
color the results so as to diminish statistical significance. Id. at 137-40.
77. Data from all 50 states were considered, although the number of states used
in each calculation varied with the status in each state of the remedy being considered
and the applicability of available data. See note 67 supra.
78. Some calculations indicated a curtailment as large as 20%. The report concluded,
however, that the 4% figure was a more realistic estimate. Id. at 134.
79. "Prohibition of attorney fees" refers to the inclusion in the contract of a provision
requiring the defaulting debtor to pay the creditor's reasonable attorney's fees.
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ment, the supply of credit. A prohibition of wage assignment was shown to
restrict the number of loans under $300. s°
Regarding personal loans made by credit unions, prohibition of wage
assignment was found to reduce the supply of credit; other sanctions tested 8'
were not found to have a significant effect.82 The importance of wage assignment was largely explained by the fact that most credit unions operate on
a small scale83 and are closely related to the debtor's employer.84 Interestingly, none of the collection sanctions was shown to affect significantly the supply
of personal loans made by commercial banks.8 5 The study suggested that
this inconsistency may be illusory. Banks typically lend to lower risk borrowers than do finance companies and credit unions 6 and also make more frequent use of security devices, such as deposit set-offs and collateral., As might
be expected, some reduction in the availability of credit in the secondary
market of purchased paper was indicated when holder in due course and
waiver of buyer defenses were denied, although the effects were not great.8 8
In summary, the study, noted that results were by and large consistent
with creditor appraisal of the collection sanctions. This observation suggests
that gaps in the analysis regarding acceleration and repossession might be
safely filled by assuming similar relationships between those remedies and
the results of the study.89 Repossession has also been the subject of independent study. In preparation of an amicus curiae brief9 ° for Adams v.
Egley,9 1 Dr. Robert Johnson analyzed repossession in the California automobile credit market. Unlike the NCCF, Johnson attempted to calculate the
actual costs of increased procedural requirements for repossession as mandated by Fuentes. Expressed simply, Johnson's approach consisted of breaking down the procedural scheme set forth in Fuentes into its component parts92
and then estimating the cost of delay attributable to the newly imposed procedural requirements. The study, based on 1971 figures, concluded that the
80. An explanation of the effect of wage assignment on small loans was that finance
companies must have assurances that small loan collection can be made simply and inexpensively. Inclusion of wage assignment in a credit contract provides this assurance.
NCCF STUDIES, supra note 46, at 187-38.
81. Other sanctions that were tested included garnishment and confession judgments.
Id. at 140-41.
82. Id. at 140-43.
83. See note 80 supra.
84. NCCF STUDIES, supra note 46, at 142.
85. Id. at 143.
86. Low risk loans are required by banks if they are to remain low-rate lenders. The
average interest rate charged by a bank on unsecured personal loans was 13.04%, while finance
companies charged an average of 25.88% on all loans. Finance companies write off as uncollectible an average of twice as many loans as do banks. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 145.
89. Id. at 150. See also text accompanying notes 67-73.
90. The study was prepared as part of an amicus brief filed by the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. For a discussion of the study's results, see Johnson,
Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 82 (1973).
91. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
92. See Johnson, supra note 90, at 97.
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denial of self-help repossession would add an average of $219 to the cost of
repossessing a car purchased new and 5194 to the cost of repossessing a used
car. 93 If such costs were prorated among all cars financed, Johnson's figures
indicate that a prohibition of repossession would add $19.05 to each new
car and *26.40 to each used car purchased.91
Persuasive criticism of Johnson's analysis has been directed toward his
assumptions as to what procedural scheme would be required by Fuentes,
the costs of meeting the requirements, and the frequency with which the
procedure would be required. 95 Even though objective analysis indicates that
Johnson's figures may be excessive, it cannot be denied that if a complaint,
summons, and hearing were required prior to repossession, costs would increase. Based on the empirical evidence presented in the NCCF study, 90 these
higher costs would likely result in reduced availability of credit and higher
interest rates.
A limited study of the effect of increased procedural requirements on the
cost and availability of credit has also been conducted in Texas.97 Data were
acquired from local court records and interviews with bank loan officers,
finance company loan officers, and retail merchants. Since wage garnishment
is not permitted in Texas, it is not surprising that all of those interviewed
considered repossession of collateral to be the most efficacious legal method
for the collection of secured direct loans.98 Furthermore, a large percentage
of the loan officers and merchants indicated that any procedural restrictions
on repossession would probably result in reduced credit availability for the
marginal borrower. 99 It is interesting to note that despite the great concern
93.

Id.

94.
increased

rate of
reposs.
New cars...
Used cars...

X

8.7%
13.6%

cost
per reposs.
$219
$194

=

increased

increased

cost per
100 Cars

cost
per car

$1,905
$2,640

$19.05
$26.40

Id. at 94.
95.

See Dauer & Gilhoal, The Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession: A Critique
CAL. L. Rav. 116 (1973); White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 503.
96. See NCCF STUDIES, supra note 46, at 30.

for Professor Johnson and a PartialReply, 47 S.

97. The study was limited to Lubbock, Texas. The authors recognized several obvious
limitations in the study: the small number of interviews, the limited geographical area,
the primarily agricultural economy, and the subjective nature of the responses obtained.
Texas Study, supranote 56, at 56.

98. Note similar results in the NCCF STUDIES, supra note 46, at 152.
99. Bankers demonstrated more concern over restricted repossession than did finance
company officials. The authors explained the disparity by pointing out that banks make
larger loans secured by more valuable collateral that depreciates less rapidly and has a
greater resale value than collateral generally accepted by finance companies. See Texas Study,

supra note 56, at 62.
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demonstrated by lenders, the court records showed that they rarely took advantage of the sequestration procedure that was available to them. 10 0 The
study concludes that because of the small percentage of cases in which sequestration was used, procedural changes should have little impact on the
cost or availability of credit.10 1
RESEARCH,

GUIDELINES,

AND POLICY:

ELEMENTS OF CREDIT REFORM

It is significant that the results of the empirical studies considered here
have generally borne out intuitive reactions as to the effects of restricting or
prohibiting various creditor remedies. The oft-cited notion that restricting
garnishment or repossession would increase interest rates and reduce the
availability of credit seems correct. The actual impact, however, is apparently
far less than proponents of the status quo suggest. 10 2 According to the econometric analysis conducted by the NCCF, variance in the cost and availability
of credit attributable to prohibition or restriction of various sanctions was
typically very small. Indeed, the variance often failed to be statistically
significant.
These empirical results are supported in theory by the previous discussion
on the role of collection costs as a factor in determining the cost and availability of credit.10 As would be expected, more expensive creditor remedies would
add to collection costs, increasing operating expenses, and, in turn, contributing to one of the factors determinant of interest rates and availability of
credit. The explanation itself appears to demonstrate the diluting effect that
takes place. 0 4 Estimating the magnitude of this effect is made difficult by the
fact that variation in creditor remedies is only one of a number of factors
affecting the cost and availability of credit. Moreover, the degree of influence
varies significantly with the relationship between the specific sanction and
the type and source of credit.' 0 '
An understanding of these influencing factors enhances the ability of
legislatures and courts properly to surround prejudgment deprivation of
property with due process protection. In Sniadacho 6 and Fuentes107 the
Court applied a strict interpretation of due process, requiring notice and a
hearing prior to any deprivation of property. The economic tradeoffs, however, did not appear to have concerned the Court, which envisioned exceptions to its strict standards only in very special circumstances involving important governmental or general public interests. 108 In Mitchell ° and Di100. In Lubbock (population: 180,000), between September 1, 1971, and September 1,
1972, of the 60 sequestrations filed, 15 had been withdrawn and 40 were filed by the
same retailer. Only three merchants filed more than one. Id. at 59.
101. Id. at 62.
102. See, e.g., Note, Self-Help Repossession: The Constitutional Attack, the Legislatile
Response, and the Economic Implications, 62 GEo. L.J. 273 (1973).
103. See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
104. See note 57 supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
106. 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
107. 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
108. Id. at 91.
109. 416 U.S. 600, 611-16 (1974).
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Chem"0 the Court retreated from its earlier inflexible position and appeared
willing to tailor procedural requirements to accommodate various interests,
including creditors' legitimate economic interests. The Court no longer
spoke of "any deprivation,
no matter how small";" 1 rather, it called for
"accommodation" '12 and a "mix of procedural requirements."'1 Thus, the
Court presently appears to favor minimal judicial guidelines and maximum
legislative discretion in the establishment of specific procedures for debt
collection.
Recognizing the Court's guidelines as minimum procedural requirements," 4 legislatures are free to adopt procedures based on appropriate
economic considerations. Generally, prejudgment actions are economically
beneficial to the creditor only when they involve property subject to depreciation, damage, or disappearance. Otherwise, the cost of a short delay is minimal.
The Louisiana sequestration procedure" 5 upheld in Mitchell appears to
recognize this distinction. Under that statute, the creditor is required to establish proper grounds for sequestration before a judicial officer who is empowered to issue the writ. Later, if the debtor presents an adequate defense,
the court may order return of the sequestered property and assess damages
in favor of the debtor. Under this procedure valid repossessions can be made
at minimal cost while according the debtor the safeguards of judicial neutrality
in the issuance of the writ and the opportunity for an immediate postsequestration hearing. This procedure is adequate to protect the legitimate
economic interests of the creditor without sacrificing the right of the debtor
to due process of law.
Similar accommodation is possible with other sanctions. As is the case
with repossession, the total abolition of wage garnishment would likely exclude a certain class of borrower from the credit market." 6 Unlike repossession, in which the danger exists that property may be removed or destroyed,
procedural delays in garnishment would probably add little to the cost
of collection. So long as the debtor is employed, his wages are equally
available regardless of whether garnishment precedes or follows judgment.
Thus, by permitting only postjudgment garnishment, the availability of credit
would not be significantly reduced, and the full reach of procedural due
process would be provided. 'The questions of what portion of a debtor's
wages should be subject to garnishment or whether to allow wage garnishment under any circumstances go beyond economic and due process considerations to involve complex policy determinations."CONCLUSION

As legislatures consider reforming consumer credit laws to eliminate
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

95 S. Ct. 719, 722-23 (1975).
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719, 726 (1975).
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 618 n.13 (1974).
See text accompanying note 45 supra.
See note 37 supra.
See note 78 supra.
See, e.g., NCCF STuvms,supra note 46, at 153.
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